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increasing the gaps between the rich and everyone else. The corporate tax
is a burden to taxpayers not in the highest tax brackets, while those
taxpayers in the upper tax brackets can avoid it if they choose. One of the
fundamental principles in tax policy is fairness: the idea that those with
higher incomes have a higher tax burden than those with lower incomes.
Because of the structure of business tax policy, this notion of fairness has
not been met, and instead those with higher incomes bear a lower tax
burden on their investments than taxpayers with lower incomes.
There are two pieces of business tax policy that create this injustice.
First, the accredited investor rules of the Securities and Exchange Act
provide that wealthy taxpayers can choose among a myriad of investments
– publicly held corporations, hedge funds, partnerships and limited liability
companies – whereas ordinary taxpayers can only choose from investments
in publicly held corporations. Second, the tax on corporate income is a
double layer tax, whereas the tax on other investment choices is a single
layer and most often at a lower rate. When the Securities Act of 1933 was
passed and the corporate income tax was enacted in 1916, the composition
of stockholders was very different, and, therefore, the laws were enacted
without the consequences that lower and ordinary income taxpayers now
face as a result of the interaction of the two laws. The solution to this issue
is to integrate the corporate and individual income taxes and then ensure
that investment income from all investments are taxed at progressive tax
rates, so that taxpayers with higher incomes do not ultimately have a lower
tax burden than those with lower incomes.
This article examines the most prominent corporate integration
proposals and evaluates these proposals as they relate to the principles of
equity and fairness. The objective is to find an approach that achieves
corporate integration and all of its goals while also mitigating any
unfairness and inequity created by the proposal. This article suggests ways
to modify these integration proposals so that they also further vertical
equity. As currently designed, nearly all of the recent integration proposals
do not address vertical equity at all or actually serve to exacerbate the
unfairness of the corporate income tax.
The corporate tax was initially enacted to tax the wealthy on their
investments.1 As this article demonstrates, the corporate tax no longer
1. See Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income
Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 452 (2001) (arguing that a corporate income tax was
enacted as a means to reach the growing amount of wealth held in intangible assets such as
stock). The corporate tax in 1909 was actually an excise tax intended to reach wealthy
taxpayers after the Supreme Court had ruled the income tax unconstitutional in 1894. Id. at
464; cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (granting Congress the power to collect income tax
without regard to state population); Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166–81 (reimposing federal income tax).
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serves to tax the wealthy and instead is a tax on ordinary taxpayers,
permitting the wealthy a way to avoid the tax by choosing other
investments if they prefer. However, the misguided perception that
eliminating the corporate tax will only serve to benefit the wealthy
continues to persist.2 While the rich have continued to get richer, it is not
the corporate tax that the rich have benefited from- it is the investment
choices available to the rich that provide lower tax rates not available to
ordinary taxpayers that has added to the growing wealth and income
disparity. Recent data demonstrates that the top 1% of taxpayers receive
only 16.6% of their capital gain income from qualified dividends, whereas
taxpayers in the second to lowest income quintile receive 62.4% of their
capital gains come from qualified dividends, bearing the double layer of
tax.3 The corporate tax disproportionately taxes the capital gains of
taxpayers with lower incomes and spares those with the highest levels of
income.
This article will introduce and analyze various approaches to business
tax policy, how corporate capital investment is taxed, and how the way
capital investments in other entities are taxed “has an essential role to play
in terms of progressivity, given the fact that capital income is so highly
concentrated.”4 Part II of this article looks at concepts of fairness, Part III
examines business tax policy, Part IV examines the accredited investor
standard, Part V evaluates the corporate tax and looks at integration
proposals, modifying them to achieve the goals of vertical equity, and Part
VI concludes.
I.

FAIRNESS

Basic fundamental principles in taxation include the precept that taxes
must be equitable and fair.5 Fairness is determined by whether two chief
2. See, e.g., David Kocieniewski, Since 1980s, the Kindest of Tax Cuts for the Rich,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, at A12 (asserting that tax cuts have benefitted the wealthy
because investing is how they get a large percentage of their income).
3. Calculations are from date of the Tax Policy Center. See URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX
POL’Y CTR., TABLE T-09-0484, DISTRIBUTION OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL GAINS AND
QUALIFIED DIVIDENDS BY CASH INCOME PERCENTILE, 2010, BASELINE: CURRENT LAW
(2009), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/Content/PDF/T09-0490.pdf (showing that
the top 1% have $71,530 million in qualified dividends and $429,575 million in all capital
gains versus the second quintile having $4,455 million in qualified dividends and $7,133
million in all capital gains).
4. Kimberly A. Clausing, The Future of the Corporate Tax, 66 TAX L. REV. 419, 428
(2013).
5. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 777 (Modern Library 1937) (1776) (explaining that taxes should be equitably
distributed by how much a person earns); Scott A. Taylor, Corporate Integration in the
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focus areas have been met: vertical equity and horizontal equity.6 The
concept of fairness is central to the thesis of this proposal: “[f]airness is the
true focus of the corporate tax debate.”7 The horizontal equity theory holds
that similarly situated taxpayers engaged in similar activities should pay
analogous amounts of tax.8
Vertical equity is the theory that taxes should be progressive, based on
the idea that those with higher incomes have a greater ability to pay and
more disposable income and, therefore, should have a higher tax burden,
while those with a lesser amount of income have less of an ability to pay
and less disposable income and, therefore, should have a lesser tax burden.9
Ability-to-pay is determined by how much money taxpayers have available
to pay taxes after the payment of necessities. Lower-income taxpayers
have a lower ability to pay and less disposable income, which places a
greater tax burden on these taxpayers than the on higher-income taxpayers.
Integrating corporate and individual income taxes and increasing the
progressive tax rates on investment income will eliminate the two-layer tax
imposed on non-accredited taxpayers. Integration and higher progressive
tax rates will ensure that taxpayers who earn more, and have a greater
ability to pay, bear a higher burden of the tax.
II.

ACCREDITED INVESTORS
Throughout this article, the term “ordinary taxpayer” is used to

Federal Income Tax, 10 VA. TAX REV. 237, 242 (1990) (referencing Adam Smith’s
assertion that equitable taxation yields a fair result based on each citizen’s income level).
6. See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 39 (1954), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4055
[hereinafter HOUSE REPORT] (complimenting the bill on treating like outcomes, even though
affected by different methods, the same under tax law; AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR TAX POLICY AND FAIRNESS 3
(2007),
available
at
http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/Tax/Resources/TaxLegislationPolicy/Advocacy/Downlo
adableDocuments/TPCS%204%20%20principles%20for%20tax%20equity%20and%20fairness.doc.
7. Yariv Brauner, The Non-Sense Tax: A Reply to New Corporate Income Tax
Advocacy, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 591, 629 (2008). Professor Brauner focuses on
redistribution as the main element debated in fairness. As illustrated here in great detail,
redistribution is not the central element of why the corporate income tax is unfair. It is
unfair because higher income taxpayers can choose among other investments, leaving the
high corporate tax rates to be imposed on those without a choice.
8. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 39 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4017, 4055 (discussing the virtues of the proposed bill, insofar as it provides ex ante clarity
by analogously taxing similarly situated parties); Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett, A
New Measure of Horizontal Equity, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1116, 1116 (2002) (asserting that
horizontal equity theoretically treats similarly situated people equally).
9. Taylor, supra note 5, at 242-243 (explaining both horizontal and vertical equity).
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distinguish between wealthy taxpayers, who earn enough income or
possess enough wealth to qualify as accredited investors under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 and 1934, and “ordinary taxpayers,”
who do not earn or own enough and are, therefore, classified as
unsophisticated, non-accredited investors.
Non-accredited investors include taxpayers that earn less than
$200,000 a year individually or $300,000 as a married couple filing jointly
or have less than $1 million in assets, not including their primary
residence.10 As a result, ordinary taxpayers, who are non-accredited
investors, include a broad base of income levels and encompass the vast
majority of taxpayers.
The accredited investor rules were designed after the Great Depression
to protect investors from relying on false or incomplete financial
information from potential investments in business entities.11
The
Securities and Exchange Commission was charged with regulating
businesses and their financial disclosures, so that individual investors could
trust those financial statements and disclosures of the businesses when
selecting an investment, thereby avoiding some of the causes of the Great
Depression. The businesses that are regulated by the SEC, publicly held
corporations, are the businesses in which non-accredited and accredited
investors alike can invest.
However, it became clear that the SEC could not regulate or properly
investigate every business. Businesses that were too new or were privately
held and too small could not be evaluated and regulated by the SEC. For
this reason, the SEC decided that only investors who were determined to be
“sophisticated” would be permitted to invest in these businesses. Other
investors would be limited to those businesses subject to SEC regulation:
publicly held corporations.
Whether an investor is sophisticated, and therefore an accredited
investor, is determined by meeting an income test or a wealth test.12 An
10. SEC Regulation D: Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities
Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501, 230.504
(2014). The definition of an accredited investor also includes someone who has over
$1,000,000 in assets at the time of the purchase of the investment, not including their
primary residence. Id.
11. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, Title I, § 4, 48 Stat. 77 (codified as amended 15
U.S.C. § 77d (2012); SEC Regulation D: Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of
Securities Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–
508 (2007); Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2007); Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2007);
Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007); see generally Wallis K. Finger, Note:
Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s “Accredited Investor” Definition Under
the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733 (2009) (summarizing the SEC rules that were
developed).
12. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2000); Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§
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accredited investor is an individual who earns over $200,000 individually,
or $300,000 if married, yearly for the past two years, with a reasonable
anticipation of earning a similar amount, or an individual or couple with at
least $1,000,000 in net worth, not including the value of the primary
residence.13 Consequently, on the basis of the income test under the
accredited investor rules, most Congressmen are unsophisticated investors,
as are most of the other employees of the Federal Government.14 However,
reality television star Scott Disick, and others like him, who earn money
through club appearances, are sophisticated investors (his advisors
however, may not be).
As a result of these limitations on investment choices, non-accredited
investors are limited to investing in the equity of publicly held
corporations, while accredited investors may choose investments among
corporation stock, as well as equity investments in hedge funds, real estate
partnerships, venture capital partnerships, investment partnerships, and
limited liability companies.15 Furthermore, only accredited investors can
invest in initial public offerings (IPOs).16
These regulations may have been enacted to protect unaccredited
investors, but too often these rules serve instead to increase the amount of
income and wealth disparity. This is particularly true in light of the higher
tax burdens imposed on corporate equity compared to the lower tax
burdens on the investments available only to accredited investors, but not
available to non-accredited, “unsophisticated” investors. Investors who do
not qualify as accredited investors are precluded from investing in private

230.501–508 (2007); Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2007); Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505
(2007); Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007).
13. Accredited investors also include several types of business entities, many of which
must be owned by accredited investors themselves to avoid circumventing the rules.
However, this article is evaluating the tax burdens placed on individuals and therefore the
accredited investor rules outside of the application to individuals are not relevant here. Rule
501(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2007); see also Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 413, 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (2010) (recent
amendment excludes the primary residence from the calculation of net worth).
14. See generally, Ida A. Brunick, Congressional Salaries and Allowances,
CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH
SERVICE
(2014),
available
at
http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crspublish.cfm?pid=‘0E%2C*PL%5B%3D%23P%20%20%0A (describing the salary of
congressmen and women).
15. There are exceptions to the accredited investor standards for friends, families,
employees and those forming their own businesses, but this article is examining the tax rules
and inequities placed on investors, therefore, these exceptions are not relevant to this
discussion.
16. See Finger, supra note 11, at 733 (illustrating the bar against non-accredited
investors in trying to invest in private offerings).
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offerings.17 Because the accredited investor standard forces investments by
non-accredited investors into the high tax burden investments, the rule
creates a regressive tax structure and violates vertical equity.
III. THE STATE OF BUSINESS TAX POLICY
The corporate tax needs to be reformed. It is inefficient, unfair,
burdensome, does not raise the desired revenue, and makes the United
States less competitive internationally.18 “There is unanimous consensus
regarding the need for reform.”19 Corporate integration serves as a means
to increase vertical equity in corporate tax policy between low income or
typical taxpayers and high-income taxpayers.20
The three fundamental principles that guide the assessment and
analysis of tax provisions are efficiency, simplicity, and fairness.21 Current
corporate tax policy violates notions of vertical equity, a principle of
fairness. Taxpayers are taxed differently depending on the type of business
entity that they invest in. However, hedge funds, partnerships, limited
liability companies, and a variety of other business choices are only
available to accredited investors, who earn high incomes or have a certain
amount of wealth.22 Consequently, higher income investors are allowed to
invest in certain entities with lower tax consequences, which are not
available to lower income investors. The freedom of the wealthy to select
among investment options while ordinary taxpayers have limited
investment choices, combined with the two layers of tax on corporate
investment, violates the theory of vertical equity. Corporate integration can
alleviate or eliminate the vertical inequity. Many integration proposals
have been made, some alleviate vertical equity more than others, and some
can be modified to address the inequity.
17. Id.
18. Clausing, supra note 4, at 428.
19. Id. at 419.
20. This article only examines the potential fairness issues for taxpayers who are acting
as investors. It does not discuss or examine any fairness issues present for taxpayers who
are setting up or establishing a business.
21. Richard Winchester, Parity Lost: The Price of a Corporate Tax in a Progressive
World, 9 NEV. L. J. 130, 130 (2008)(citing M. LIVINGSTON, TAXATION: LAW, PLANNING AND
POLICY xxxiv (2003)); see DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2009 REVENUE PROPOSALS 1 (2008), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-ExplanationsFY2009.pdf (advocating that “Americans deserve a tax system that is simple, fair, and progrowth.”); see generally The President’s Advisory Panel of Federal Tax Reform: Simple,
Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System (2005) (discussing
efficiency, simplicity, and fairness, among other factors, and their relation to the tax codes).
22. SEC Regulation D, supra note 10, at §§ 230.501, 230.504.
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Ordinary taxpayers are limited in their investment choices by the
Securities Act of 1933 and the accredited investor standard. The security
laws are designed to protect investors and to minimize the concealed risk
investors may take. One way the laws seek to do this is through the
accredited investor rules. One possible way to eliminate the vertical
inequity created by the accredited investor standards is to repeal the
standard. However, the rules may serve a valuable purpose, and therefore
the alternative is to attack the inequity through corporate tax policy. It may
not be possible or feasible to tax all investment identically, but if higher
income taxpayers are a select group of permitted investors, those
investments cannot have a preferred rate compared to higher tax
investments available to all taxpayers.
A.

Who are stockholders and who carries a heavier burden for the
corporate tax?

The nature of stock ownership has changed with time, but corporate
and business tax policy has not kept up with the changes in ownership.
Historically, it was wealthy individuals who held stock.23 At present, stock
is owned primarily by institutional investors, either through deferred
retirement plans or directly by ordinary individuals.24 However, corporate
tax policy has not stayed contemporary with these changes, remaining
stagnant, and, as a result, the burden of the corporate tax, which was
initially designed to impact wealthy individuals, now instead impacts
ordinary taxpayers, either through direct or indirect ownership via
intermediaries. This obsolete tax policy, combined with the rules limiting
certain investments to accredited investors creates a regressive tax structure
on investments.
A study by the Brookings Institute in 2009 examined the total amount
of qualified dividends and capital gains rates received by taxpayers in
quintiles based on income.25 While the wealthiest taxpayers received the

23. See Bank, supra note 1, at 478 (proving that exclusive privileges were historically
granted to corporations where the rich held much of their wealth); cf. U.S. CONST. amend.
XVI (granting Congress the power to collect income tax without regard to state population);
Tariff Act, supra note 1, at 166–81 (re-imposing a federal income tax); Kristian Rydqvist,
Joshua Spizman, Ilya Strebulaev, Government Policy and Ownership of Equity Securities,
111 J. OF FIN. ECON. 70, 71 (2012) (discussing the changes in stock ownership from
households to financial institutions).
24. Rydqvist, supra note 23, at 71; see URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR., supra note
3 (showing tax ownership and income by quintile).
25. Calculations are derived from data collected by the Tax Policy Center. See UrbanBrookings Tax Pol’y Ctr., Table T09-0484, Distribution of Taxes on Long-Term Capital
Gains and Qualified Dividends by Cash Income Percentile, 2010, Baseline: Current Law
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highest amount of qualified dividends and capital gains, the percentage
those qualified dividends made of their total capital gains created a very
different picture, and demonstrated concretely that taxpayers with lower
amounts of income carry a greater share of the corporate tax burden
proportionately to their income. For example, the top 1% of the wealthiest
taxpayers received only 16.6% of their capital gains from qualified
dividends, the top 20% received 20.7% of their capital gains from qualified
dividends, the fourth quintile received 47.3% of their capital gains from
qualified dividends, the middle quintile received 53.6% of their capital
gains from qualified dividends, and the second quintile received 62.4% of
their capital gains from qualified dividends. Based on these numbers, it is
clear that as income goes down, the proportion that dividends represent of
capital gain income goes up, and, alternatively, as income goes up, the
fewer dividends are part of capital gain. The corporate double tax is
ensnaring those taxpayers in the lower brackets on their capital gains, while
the wealthy are able to escape the corporate tax on most of their capital
gains.
Dividend tax rates became progressive in 2013, including three rates
for taxpayers reaching 20%, in the highest ordinary income tax bracket.26
These rates were also increased by a surcharge on capital gains of 3.8% by
the Affordable Care Act.27 In spite of the progressivity built into the
dividend tax rates, unfairness still exists - the progressivity is not sufficient
to create vertical equity. The accredited investor standard still exists, and as
a result, taxpayers with large amounts of wealth or income who will qualify
as accredited investors have the ability to choose to invest in identical
businesses held in different types of entities- a partnership that is subject to
only a single layer of tax or a corporation that is subject to a double layer of
tax. Higher income taxpayers can still choose between investing in a low
tax entity versus a high tax entity, while ordinary taxpayers are only
permitted to invest in publicly held corporations. As a result, investments
by the wealthy are taxed at a lower rate and investments by ordinary
taxpayers in corporations are subject to the double tax. Even though the
capital gains rates are progressive, only higher income taxpayers have the
option of choosing between identical investments in two types of business
entities - entities with a single layer of tax or with a double layer of tax ensuring that the higher income taxpayer will seek the most economically
efficient return and will invest in an entity in which ordinary taxpayers
(2009), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/Content/PDF/T09-0484.pdf.
26. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, H.R. 8, 112th Cong. (2013).
27. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. Law No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
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cannot invest.
B.

Calls to Revise the Corporate Tax

Much has been made in the public and legislature about corporate
inversions and corporations fleeing the United States taxing jurisdiction
because of high corporate income tax rates.28 The United States Treasury
Department has stated that inversions cost the United States billions in lost
taxes each year.29 Corporations are encouraged to earn their income
elsewhere to avoid the high tax rates in the United States.30 Lowering tax
rates alone, as a sole remedy, is not enough to address the issues with
competitiveness of the United States internationally; it is not enough to fix
the many issues with the corporate tax, and it is not enough to redress the
lack of fairness created by the corporate tax.31
A growing consensus of experts have suggested that it is imperative
we re-evaluate the corporate income tax.32 There is a bipartisan call to
revise the corporate tax because it is decidedly complex and inefficient, and
because of the harm it does to the competitiveness of the United States.33
28. See Tyler M. Dumler, Charging Less to Make More: The Causes and Effects of the
Corporate Inversion Trend in the U.S. and the Implications of Lowering the Corporate Tax
Rate, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 89 (2012)(examining the causes and effects of tax avoidance
schemes, including the corporate inversion trend, pursued by U.S. multinational
corporations (INCs)).
29. See Corporate Inversion: Hearing on S. 2119 Before the S. Subcomm. on Treasury
and Gen. Gov’t of the Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. 39 (2002)(statement of
William Gale, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director for Economic Studies, The Brookings
Institution)(examining in depth the inversion cost due to lost taxes).
30. See Principles for Comprehensive Income Tax Reform: Testimony Before the
United States S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Daniel N. Shaviro,
Wayne Perry Professor of Taxation, New York University School of Law) [hereinafter
Shaviro] (detailing Professor Shaviro’s statements on the need to reform U.S. tax policy);
THE WHITE HOUSE, FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY SUMMIT 29 (Feb. 23, 2009) [hereinafter FISCAL
RESPONSIBILITY SUMMIT].
31. See David Cay Johnston, Keynote Address at the Kansas Journal of Law & Public
Policy’s 2012 Symposium, Corporate Tax Reform: Making America Competitive, 21 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 371, 372 (2012)(calling for active reform of the American tax system).
32. See Shaviro, supra note 30 (providing Professor Shaviro’s viewpoint on reevaluating the corporate income tax); FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY SUMMIT, supra note 30; see
also Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate Double Tax, 95 VA. L.
REV. 517, 518 (2009) (“[A] recent turn of the wheel has again put forth one of the more
intriguing reform proposals: relief from the double taxation of corporate income.”); David
Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
1627, 1637 (1999) (citing opponents of double taxation); see generally George K. Yin,
Corporate Tax Reform, Finally, After 100 Years, TAX ANALYSTS 114 (2009) (arguing for
changing the tax system).
33. See Noel B. Cunningham & Mitchell L. Engler, Prescription for Corporate Income
Tax Reform: A Corporate Consumption Tax, 66 TAX L. REV. 445, 445 (2013) (“[T]here is a
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President Obama has declared a need to revise the corporate income tax.34
Corporations spend significant resources trying to navigate or circumvent
the corporate income tax.35 The Treasury Department recently advised that
relief from the double corporate tax would increase overall economic
growth.36 Furthermore, the United States has one of the highest statutory
and effective corporate tax rates in the world.37 Some experts have
advanced that the corporate tax policy has diminished the United States’
competitiveness, costing jobs and decreasing the tax base.38 They have
suggested that corporate integration would make the United States more
competitive by lowering or eliminating the corporate income tax rates.39
Vertical equity and fairness are missing, however, from the discourse.
Absent from the debate regarding the state of the corporate income tax and
integration, is the prospect that corporate integration could further vertical
equity by increasing progressivity, and eliminating the repressiveness of
the corporate tax policy. As one commentator noted, if a study of the deals
made by Bain Capital Management was done it would reveal that most of
the deals would have been organized as a pass through entity because
“virtually the only tax ever paid is the 15% by the owners of the firm.”40
Ensuring that accredited investors with high incomes carry a higher tax
burden than lower income, non-accredited, investors will eliminate the
regressivity of the corporate tax policy combined with the accredited
investor standards.
widely-shared bipartisan view that the corporate income tax is a ‘bad’ tax that is desperately
in need of reform or repeal”).
34. THE WHITE HOUSE & DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR
BUSINESS TAX REFORM (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/Documents/The-Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-02-22-2012.pdf.
35. JOINT ECON. COMM., REFORMING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM TO INCREASE
TAX
COMPETITIVENESS
(2005),
available
at
http://www.jec.senate.gov/republicans/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=f1647b9a-44184bb1-8b03-941a528ae6fc.
36. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION AND
GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS: BACKGROUND PAPER 1–2, 710 (2007), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/07230%20r.pdf [hereinafter
TREASURY CONFERENCE]. 
37. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT TAX
DATABASE,
CORPORATE
AND
CAPITAL
INCOME
TAXES,
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm#C_CorporateCaptial
[hereinafter
OECD Corporate Rates 2009](showing the United States with the second highest corporate
tax rate and the highest central government corporate tax rate); see also TREASURY
CONFERENCE, supra note 36, at 35 (stating within the OECD, the United States has the
second highest statutory corporate rate and the fourth highest effective marginal rate).
38. Id. at 1–2.
39. See TREASURY CONFERENCE, supra note 36 (explaining the positive effects of
corporate integration).
40. Johnston, supra note 31, at 374.
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IV. THE CORPORATE TAX
The structure of the corporate income tax is not aligned with the
vertical equity principle and imposes a higher burden on other taxpayers.
The corporate income tax is often referred to as a double tax, but
technically the term “double tax” is not accurate because there is not an
equal tax applied twice. Instead, there is a corporate income tax, and then a
second tax at the individual shareholder level on earnings generated by the
corporation that are distributed to the shareholders, and the increase of
value in the stock when the shareholder sells his investment.41 The
undistributed earnings of the corporation increase the value of the
corporation’s stock so that earnings of the corporation are taxed to
shareholders either as distributions or when the stock is sold.42
A.

Rationales for the Corporate Tax

The rationales behind the corporate tax must be evaluated to ensure
that those principles are still relevant all these years later, and to make
certain that alternative methods of corporate tax and integration can still
achieve the relevant goals. One of the most prevalent justifications for the
tax policy on corporations is that the corporate income tax serves as a
means to tax wealth, particularly because when it was enacted, there was
no individual income tax.43 This was the reasoning given for enacting the
corporate tax in 1909.44 Back when it was enacted, the corporate tax was an
effective method for reaching wealth since much of the wealth in the
United States was held in corporations.45 At that time, the corporate income
tax was seen as a means of maintaining or increasing progressivity and

41. See Taylor, supra note 5, at 246 (“[A] ten dollar dividend from a share of stock is
no different from a ten dollar increase in the value of the same stock. Yet the realization
model taxes the dividend but not the increase in value.”).
42. See DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
FISCAL
YEAR
2004
REVENUE
PROPOSALS
11
(2003),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-ExplanationsFY2004.pdf (providing that earnings retained by a corporation increase the value of the
stock and as a result, the value of the stock reflects the retained earnings).
43. Bank, supra note 1, at 452, 478 (arguing that a corporate income tax was enacted
as a means to reach the growing amount of wealth held in intangible assets such as stock).
44. The corporate tax in 1909 was actually an excise tax intended to reach wealthy
taxpayers after the Supreme Court had ruled the income tax unconstitutional in 1894. Id. at
478; U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166–81.
45. See Steven A. Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat for Declining Dividends?
Evidence from History, 56 TAX. L. REV. 463, 478 (2002) (explaining the reasons behind
passing corporate taxation).
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avoiding the significant evasion that was common.46 When the Sixteenth
Amendment to the Constitution was passed, the individual income tax was
enacted and resulted in the two layers of tax on corporate income.47
However, the preferred investment vehicles for the wealthy are
different from the investment choices available in 1909. In 1909, there
were no hedge funds, limited liability companies, or complex financial
products. Accordingly, wealth is held and invested differently today than
how it was in 1909, and yet tax policy on corporate income taxes has not
kept pace with these changes. For example, investments in partnerships and
many limited liability companies are not subject to an entity level tax.
Instead, only the investor bears the burden of the tax in his personal income
tax rates. Consequently, the current corporate income tax encourages selfintegration when choosing the entity to form a business and the type of
investment options, such as choosing the partnership form rather than the
corporate form, and subsequently the choice of investments in the different
entities.48 However, since these investment choices are limited to accredited
investors, the corporate tax policy becomes regressive because nonaccredited investors do not have the option of self-integration through
investment choice, and therefore bear a higher tax burden than higher
income taxpayers.
“Up to 40% of all stocks in the United States- and between 60% and
85% of stocks held by domestic agents such as mutual funds, pension
funds, and insurance companies are now kept in tax-deferred plans.”49 Tax
deferred plans imply that the individuals are not paying tax yet, but the
implications of the regressive nature of the corporate tax still affect stock
held in tax deferred plans because the corporation is paying the income tax
and, therefore, the indirect equity investment held by the taxpayer carries
the tax burden of the corporate income tax. When the taxpayer withdraws
his investment, he will be subject to tax at ordinary income tax rates, not
just on the deferred income from his labor, but also on the appreciation
value of his equity investment.
Congress used the corporate tax as a way to regulate corporations
46. See JANE GRAVELLE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION:
ISSUES AND OPTIONS 3 (1991) (arguing while progressivity is often given as a justification, it
may be overstated); see generally STEPHEN FRANCIS WESTON, PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN
TAXATION 283 (1903)(examining the tax system’s complications through an analysis of the
political, economic and ethical principles of taxation).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166–81.
48. See generally DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE vii (1992), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/integration.pdf (describing
different methods of integration).
49. Rydqvist, supra note 23, at 3 (2012).
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before the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934.50 After these acts were passed,
however, Congress did not also review the corporate tax in light of no
longer needing this second layer of oversight.
The varied tax structures and disparate tax burdens for different types
of entities are normally rationalized by the assumption that distinct
business entities have distinct privileges and design entitling them to
different tax burdens. Absent, however, in this analysis, is the recognition
that only wealthy or high income taxpayers deemed “sophisticated”
accredited investors can invest directly in most of these entities, while the
vast majority of taxpayers are limited to investments in publicly held
corporations. Unfortunately, this consideration has been neglected when
deciding corporate tax policy.
The income generated from businesses has changed with time as well.
Business income received by unincorporated forms of business increased
from twenty-one percent in 1980 to fifty percent in 2008.51 Revenue is a
significant consideration for any corporate integration recommendation.
The potential for revenue loss if the corporate income tax is repealed is
often identified as a potential barrier to corporate integration.52 Some have
argued that the corporate income tax is not in fact a significant source of
revenue.53 The challenge then becomes apportioning the tax burden from
the missing revenue among the taxpayers that should properly bear the tax
burden. However, in most contexts, placing the responsibility for the lost
revenue on the corporation is misplaced. Rather, the revenue obligation is
more fittingly assigned to the individual investors because it is individuals
that carry the burden of the corporate income tax.54 There is a debate over
who ultimately bears the incidence of the corporate tax: shareholders

50. SEC Regulation D: Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities
Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501, 230.504
(2010) (defining an accredited investor as also including someone who has over $1,000,000
in assets at the time of the purchase of the investment).
51. J. GREGORY BALLENTINE, EQUITY, EFFICIENCY AND THE U.S. CORPORATE INCOME
TAX 5 (1980); see STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT xviii (2010) [hereinafter FROM SWORD TO
SHIELD] (noting that the corporate income tax still does serve as meaningful revenue
source).
52. See David J. Shakow, Wither, “C”!, 45 TAX L. REV. 177, 213 (1990) (“A significant
political problem with a proposal for corporate integration is that it would eliminate all or
part of the corporate tax, a significant source of federal revenues.”).
53. See Yariv Brauner, The Non-Sense Tax: A Reply to New Corporate Income Tax
Advocacy, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 591, 592-593 (2008) (citing Organization for Economic
Co-Operation and Development, Revenue Statistics 1965–2006 (2007)).
54. David A. Weisbach, The Irreducible Complexity of Firm-Level Income Taxes:
Theory and Doctrine in the Corporate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 215, 218 (2007); JOINT ECON.
COMM., supra note 35, at 2.
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through less profits, consumers through higher prices or labor through
lower wages or unemployment.55 Recent studies indicate that the burden of
the corporate income tax falls on labor.56 Ultimately, however, whether it is
the investor or the consumer or labor, the corporate tax is not borne by the
corporation, but by individuals.
Another outdated explanation for the corporate income tax is the
benefit theory. A separate justification for the corporate tax, known as the
benefit theory of limited liability, was that the various legal protections
corporations receive due to their classification as a separate entity justified
the tax.57 The benefit theory asserts that because the shareholders of
corporations are entitled to limited liability, this limited liability is a taxable
government service.58 Notwithstanding the limited liability that
shareholders enjoy, because of the similar limited liability enjoyed by
members in a limited liability company, limited partnerships and other
types of entities not subject to an additional tax for this government service,
this theory is no longer relevant.
The two layer corporate income tax is frequently justified as a way to
raise revenue.59 Some argue that the revenue from corporate income is
overstated.60 Many corporations pay taxes and do generate revenue.
However, if the corporate tax is revised, any perceived lost revenue can be
made up by taxing the appropriate individuals, the investors, which would
increase the burden on the wealthier taxpayers with a greater ability to pay,
resulting in more corporations remaining in the United States rather than

55. See Adam H. Rosenzweig, A Corporate Tax for the Next One Hundred Years: A
Proposal for a Dynamic, Self-Adjusting Corporate Tax Rate, 108 NW. U.L. REV. 1029, 1032
(2014) (discussing different sides of the argument).
56. WILLIAM M. GENTRY, DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE ON THE
INCIDENCE OF CORPORATE TAX 32, 35 (2007); JULIE-ANNE CRONIN ET AL., DEPT. OF THE
TREASURY OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, DISTRIBUTING THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX: REVISED
U.S. TREASURY METHODOLOGY 2 (2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/tax-analysis/Documents/OTA-T2012-05-Distributing-the-Corporate-Income-TaxMethodology-May-2012.pdf; Bruce Bartlett, Who Pays the Corporate Income Tax, N.Y.
TIMES
ECONOMIX
BLOG
(Feb.
19,
2013,
6:00
AM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/who-pays-the-corporate-income-tax/
(summarizing 4 recent articles discussing the incidence of the corporate income tax).
57. See BALLENTINE, supra note 51, at 5 (stating “[w]hile limited liability may provide
very large benefits, it is a virtually costless government service”). While this is true, limited
liability is provided by the state corporate codes, not by the federal government or the
federal taxing authority. Thus, the federal government was taxing corporations on a
“benefit” that it did not bestow upon them.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., FROM SWORD TO SHIELD, supra note 51, at xviii (noting that the corporate
income tax still does serve as meaningful revenue source).
60. See BALLENTINE, supra note 51, at 7 (“The need for revenue as the sole reason for a
tax could give rise to odious taxes.”).
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leaving through corporate inversions and similar techniques. 61
The corporate income tax is also used as a tool for taxing foreign
investors and tax-exempt investors that invest in corporate equity and
would escape taxes without applying the tax at the corporate entity level.62
Some of these tax-exempt entities are deferred tax plans and other
retirement plans where the investments will ultimately be subject to tax
when the investments are distributed.
B.

The Impact of the Corporate Tax on Fairness

The cumulative tax rate on corporate earnings is essentially a flat tax
and not in any way progressive, despite the goals of vertical equity. The tax
rate on corporate equity investments is the same regardless of a taxpayer’s
income level. The progressivity reflected in the tax rates on corporate
income was eliminated in 2003 and only returned in a moderate form in
2013. However, when coupled with the choices that a high-income
taxpayer can make as an accredited investor, whether the system reflects
any vertical equity is tenuous. Prior to 2003, dividends were taxed as
ordinary income, while the sale or exchange of an investment was
characterized as capital.63 The progressivity of ordinary income rates
ensured that high-income taxpayers at least carried a higher tax burden with
respect to dividends, if not other capital gains.64 In 2003, dividend taxation
61. See Jon Greenberg, Sanders: One out of four corporations pay no taxes, Tampa
Bay
Times,
available
at
http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/statements/2013/sep/26/bernie-s/sanders-one-out-four-corporations-pay-no-taxes/;
Robert S. McIntyre, Matthew Gardner & Richard Phillips, The Sorry State of Corporate
Taxes: What Fortune 500 Firms Pay (or Don’t Pay) in the USA and What They Pay Abroad
—
2008
to
2012
(2014),
available
at
http://www.ctj.org/corporatetaxdodgers/sorrystateofcorptaxes.pdf.
62. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1201-1202 (2004) (explaining the defenses of the
current corporate tax structure).
63. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (“JGTRRA”), Pub. L. No.
108-27, 117 Stat. 752, Sec. 302. When dividends were taxed as ordinary income, some
taxpayers were able to use the corporate form to shelter income when their individual
ordinary rates would have exceeded the corporate rate. This assumes investors chose to
invest in corporations rather than other options available to them as accredited investors. See
Mark P. Gergen, How Corporate Integration Could Kill the Market for Corporate Tax
Shelters, 61 TAX L. REV. 145, 156 (2008) (describing the decision-making process for
choosing a corporate form when considering tax implications); see also Gravelle, supra note
46, at 5 (discussing the different tax statuses); William Plumb, The Federal Income Tax
Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369,
374–75 (1970) (analyzing how corporations’ accumulation of earnings can enable
shareholders to avoid the double-tax).
64. I.R.C. § 1(a)-(c). While ordinary income tax rates are intended to be progressive in
their increasing in percentage as income levels increase, whether they are in fact progressive
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was revised and dividends and capital gains were taxed at a flat 15%,
regardless of a taxpayer’s income level. In 2013, capital gains rates were
amended to be more progressive and, as a result, dividend tax rates jumped
from 15% to 18.8% (15% plus 3.8% from the Medicare) for joint taxpayers
making over $250,000 up to 23.8% (20% plus 3.8%) for joint taxpayers
that make over $400,000.65
In addition to the capital gains rates on dividends, the corporate
income tax rate is also not progressive. The corporate income tax rate is a
flat 34%.66 Combining that tax with the capital gain tax results in a total
individual tax rate, applicable to income generated by corporations of
between 43.9% and 49.75%.67
Further exacerbating the lack of vertical equity and the regressive
nature of the corporate income tax is the fact that income tax rates are
higher than non-accredited investors’ ordinary tax rate. The individual
income tax rate ranges from 35% to 39.6% for taxpayers earning between
$405,100 and $457,600 respectively.68 For taxpayers earning less than
$300,000, the minimum income level needed to meet the accredited
investor standard, the tax rate drops from 33% to 10% while the typical
corporate tax rate ranges from 35% to 38%.69 As this illustrates, the
corporate income tax rate is higher for non-accredited investors than their
personal tax rate, whereas the corporate income tax is lower than the tax
rate for accredited investors. The higher tax rate on corporate income
means non-accredited investors bear a higher tax burden on their
investment income than from their earnings from labor or interest.70 The
ability to choose among investments in various types of entities, and in
particular tax-efficient pass though entities, affects the tax burdens on
investors.
Vertical equity supports progressive tax systems by imposing a larger
portion of the income tax on those with both a greater ability to pay and
more disposable income. Ironically, the corporate income tax may actually

is questionable. Ordinary income tax rates are essentially flat once a taxpayer earns over
$375,000, whether that be $3,750,000 or $375,000,000. However slight, the ordinary
income rates on dividend income formerly offered a semblance of progressivity for nonaccredited taxpayers.
65. I.R.C. § 1(h)(11).
66. The rate changed to 35% for a brief period and then returned to 34%. I.R.C. § 11.
67. I.R.C. § 1 (a), (b), (c), (h). The current corporate tax rate according to I.R.C. § 1 is
35%. Therefore, if a corporation earns $100, its income tax will be $35, leaving $65 to be
distributed to shareholders. The current capital gains rate in I.R.C. § 1(h) is 15%, so the tax
on the $65 would be $9.75. This means out of $100 in earnings $44.75, or 44.75%, is taxed.
68. I.R.C. § 1 (a).
69. I.R.C. § 11 (a).
70. I.R.C. § 1(a), (b), (c), (h); I.R.C. § 11.
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be regressive, as those with lower incomes potentially have a higher tax
burden than those with larger incomes. The combination of preferential
capital gain rates, high corporate income tax rates, and the limitation on the
investment choices of non-accredited investors results in a regressive tax
burden.
Some contend the burden created the corporate income tax is
progressive because, although the income tax rates are flat, the taxpayers
bearing its burden are the wealthy, who hold the vast majority of corporate
stock.71 However, while this viewpoint may have been accurate in the past,
it is no longer an accurate characterization of corporate stock ownership.
Although the corporate income tax was originally enacted as a proxy for
tax wealth, since the wealthy are no longer the primary stockholders, the
income tax actually primarily affects ordinary shareholders and
institutional investors. Strebulaev and his coauthors, Kristian Rydqvist and
Joshua Spizman of Binghamton University in New York, made the
empirical discovery that up to 70% of all stocks in the United States - held
by domestic agents such as mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance
companies - are now kept in tax-deferred plans. They found “[i]n the
United States, just after the war [World War II], households directly
own[ed] 90% of the stock market; by 2010, this figure has come down to
below 30%. The share ownership has largely migrated to financial
institutions that have ascended to the largest holder of equity. In 2010,
domestic financial institutions own almost 50% of U.S. stocks.”72 They
estimated that “up to 40% of all stocks in the United States between 60%
and 85% of stocks held by domestic agents such as mutual funds, pension
funds, and insurance companies—are now kept in tax-deferred plans.”73
Some academics dismiss the need for integration or the treatment of
ordinary taxpayers by claiming that despite the tax rates, the wealthy
ultimately bear the burden of the corporate tax. Resolving which taxpayers
bear the burden of the corporate income tax is a fundamental question to
appropriately designing the tax.74 There are three parties who each may
bear the majority of the tax burden: investors, consumers, or labor.75 The
71. Bank, supra note 51, at xviii.
72. Rydqvist, Spizman, & Strebulaev, supra note 23, at 2.
73. Id. at 1-2.
74. See William M. Gentry, A Review of the Evidence on the Incidence of the
Corporate Income Tax, DEPT. OF THE TREASURY (2007) available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/ota101.pdf
(noting the uncertainty of who bears the burden of the corporate tax); see also Emil Sunley,
Corporate Integration: An Economic Perspective, 47 TAX L. REV. 621, 623-26
(1992)(analyzing how various forms of corporate integration would affect the tax burden).
75. Gentry, supra note 56; see also Gravelle, supra note 46, at 34-35 (discussing tax
burdens).
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latest studies conclude labor bears most of the corporate tax’s burdens
rather than investors.76 Because of how the primary investors in
corporations have changed, regardless of whether the burden is placed on
investors or labor, the ordinary taxpayer bears the tax burden (as opposed
to the wealthy or even corporations themselves).77
C.

Fairness in Light of the Issues Raised by Accredited Investor
Standards

Wealthy taxpayers, because they are accredited investors, have
investment options. If they find investing in corporations to be too
expensive, the wealthy have the freedom to make less expensive
investments, enabling better returns and creating less of a tax burden.
Corporations typically carry a higher tax burden than partnerships.78
Ordinary taxpayers, however, do not have this choice and are limited to
investing in highly taxed corporate stock.
The tax legislation that provided that dividends from corporations
would be taxed at capital gains rates, rather than ordinary income,
mitigated some of the regressive nature of the tax burden placed on nonaccredited investors. However, it did not eliminate the regressive nature of
the corporate income tax itself. It did not make the tax burdens placed on
equity ownership progressive and did not result in vertical equity.
Vertical equity is not possible because of the accredited investor rules.
Taxpayers with enough income or wealth to qualify as an accredited
investor can choose from identical investments, some of which are taxed at
the investor’s tax rate because ownership is through a partnership or an
limited liability company as compared with others that would bear the
burden of the corporate income tax, as well as ownership takes the form of
corporate stock. The accredited investor can choose which investment will
be more economically efficient. Non-accredited investors, in contrast, are
limited to only investing in corporate stock, even though that investment
carries a high tax burden. This choice, or lack there of, coupled with the tax
policies in place for taxing corporate income and stock versus partnership
ownership create a regressive tax burden. “[T]he double tax puts the public
businesses at a disadvantage” to private businesses not subject to two layers
of taxation, demonstrating the lack of vertical equity.79 The only investment
option available to non-accredited investor taxpayers, save for specific
76. Id. at 32-35.
77. See David Weisbach, supra note 54, at 218 (explaining who bears the burden of
corporate tax).
78. See Bank, supra note 51, at xii–xiii (comparing the tax burden of various entities).
79. Doran, supra note 32, at 528.
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limited exceptions, is to invest in a public corporation. However, tax policy
provides that corporations face a double tax, an initial tax on corporate
income and a second tax on distributions to the shareholder. Partnership
income, however including income from LLCs taxed as partnerships, is
typically only taxed once.
Only accredited investors are permitted to invest in both public
corporations and pass-through entities. Non-accredited investors are
considered too unsophisticated to invest in the partnership or the LLC taxed
as a partnership. As a result, ordinary taxpayers who are not accredited
investors face a higher tax burden. Corporate investments bear an average
tax of thirty percent, whereas investments in partnerships are taxed at a
twenty percent rate.80 “Effective tax rates on corporate equity capital are
seventy percent higher than rates on non-corporate equity capital.”81
In the debate over corporate integration, many critics of integration
demonstrate a disregard of non-accredited investors. Some argue the
double tax is elective because taxpayers can simply choose to invest in
either a corporation or in an entity such as a partnership or LLC.82
However, non-accredited investors cannot choose between these
investments. The corporate income tax is elective for accredited investors,
but not for non-accredited investors.83
Because non-accredited investors are not considered sophisticated
enough to invest in entities with a single layer of tax, it could be argued
that the higher tax burden these taxpayers face is instead the cost of better
security in their investments as provided by oversight by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Essentially, the higher tax burden imposed on nonaccredited investors could be seen as a fee the investor must pay for
government supervision. “Whether it makes policy sense or not, the
corporate double tax serves as a toll charge imposed by the government on
80. Bank, supra note 51, at xii–xiii.
81. See Gravelle, supra note 46, at 14 (providing that there is “no ideal solution . . . as
long as tax-exempt entities maintain their preferential tax treatment”).
82. See Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, Office of the
Secretary Department of the Treasury, at 135 (1984), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/tres84v1All.pdf (noting the
neutrality in the selection of organizational form would eliminate such tax differences and
the ability to circumvent the double tax).
83. The number of accredited individual investors was estimated to be between 5 and
7.2 million people prior to the enactment of Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, which in turn decreased the number of accredited investors by excluding
primary residences from the calculation of net worth. See Scott Shane, How Dodd’s Reform
Plan Hurts Startup Finance, BUSINESSWEEK, March 19, 2010, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/mar2010/sb20100318_367600.htm
(examining the reduction of the number of accredited informal investors from 121,000 to
174,000 people in the United States).
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accessing capital through the securities markets.”84 And because accredited
investors can elect not to pay the “fee” by investing in lower tax burden
investments, the fee is only mandatory for non-accredited investor
taxpayers, who cannot make unregulated investments. The corporate tax
penalizes businesses that choose to be corporations rather than other forms
such as limited liability companies or partnerships.85
The violation of vertical equity caused by the accredited investor
standard and the tax burden felt by investors in corporations versus
taxpayers in partnerships is evidenced by the following example illustrating
the after tax returns for a non-accredited taxpayer’s investment in a public
corporation as compared with the after tax returns of an accredited
investors in a partnership. Alex is an accredited investor who invests
$200,000 in a partnership, Pennsatucky, which is in the business of
pharmaceutical distribution. In 2014, Pennsatucky earns and distributes
$15,000 in pretax ordinary income earnings on Alex’s $200,000 investment
as a pass-through entity. Pennsatucky will not pay a tax on its earnings or
on distribution to Alex. Alex in turn incurs a single level tax at a maximum
ordinary rate of thirty-five percent on the $15,000 partnership earnings,
resulting in a tax of $5,250 and an after-tax return of $9,750 to Alex, an
effective tax rate of 35%. The effective rate would be even lower if the
income from Pennsatucky is capital. If his income was considered capital,
Alex would be taxed $3,570 and receive an after tax return of $11,430,
reflecting a burden of 23.8% percent (assuming the highest capital gain tax
rate).
Contrast Alex’s tax burden with non-accredited investor Piper who
invests $200,000 in the publicly traded corporation Dandelion, which is
also engaged in pharmaceutical distribution. If Piper earns $15,000 of
pretax earnings on her $200,000 investment, Dandelion will incur a
corporate tax of $5,250. It can then distribute a dividend of $9,750 to Piper,
who will incur a second level of tax of $1,462.50 ($65 dividend distribution
multiplied by the 15% tax rate) resulting in an after tax return of $8,287.50
and an effective tax rate of 44.75%. The effective rate will not be lower for
Piper, even if the income earned by Dandelion is capital. Therefore if the
income is capital, Piper’s after tax return will still be $8,287.50 and her
effective tax rate would remain 44.75%.
The regressive nature of the corporate tax burden and the concomitant
violation of vertical equity is apparent in the additional tax burden that
Piper bears of 9.75 %, if the business generates ordinary income, or
84. Doran, supra note 32, at 528.
85. Noel B. Cunningham and Mitchell L. Engler, supra note 33, at 447; Joseph J.
Thorndike, The Durability of a Dysfunctional Tax: Public Opinion and the Failure of
Corporate Tax Reform, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347, 354 (2012).
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20.95% if the business generates capital income because Piper is a nonaccredited investor and can only select the Dandelion investment. In
contrast, Alex can choose which entity to invest in, put forward an identical
amount as Piper in the same type of business, and still generate an identical
amount of pre-tax earnings on her $200,000 investment. Despite how
equivalent their businesses are, Alex is bears a lower tax burden even
though she is a high income tax payer. Alex has the choice to invest in
either Pennsatucky or Dandelion whereas Piper is only permitted to invest
in Dandelion.
Ironically, to achieve the same after-tax result as Alex (an after-tax
return of $9,750), Piper, the taxpayer deemed “unsophisticated” as an nonaccredited investor, will have to consistently make significantly superior
investment decisions than Alex, the “sophisticated” accredited investor.
Specifically, Piper will have to make an investment in a publicly traded
corporation that would generate pre-tax earnings of $17,647 (compared to
Alex’s $15,000) on her $200,000 investment in order to realize an after tax
return of $9,750. If the business generated capital income, Piper would
have to select an investment in a publicly traded corporation that generates
$20,688 of pre-tax earnings compared to Alex’s investment earnings of
$15,000 to match Alex’s after-tax returns. This scenario reveals the
regressive nature of the corporate income tax burden when examined in
conjunction with the investment choice limitations placed on ordinary
taxpayers by the accredited investor standard.
As a result of the lack of vertical equity in the tax policy for
corporations and the fact that non-accredited investors face a higher tax
burden on equivalent investments compared with accredited investors, nonaccredited investors face greater pressure to make investments that generate
significantly superior returns in order to earn a similar amount after taxes.
Accredited investors are permitted to avoid paying the structural tax
penalty inherent in investments in publicly traded corporations, while nonaccredited investors do not have the ability to elect out of the corporate tax
burden.
V.

SOLUTIONS TO THE VERTICAL EQUITY ISSUE IN CORPORATE TAX
POLICY

There are ultimately two possible solutions to addressing the unequal
tax burden placed on non-accredited investors by corporate tax policy. The
first is to revisit the accredited investor standard. The second is to revise
the corporate income tax to address the inequity caused by rates and the
double tax. This article is focused on the latter of these options.
There are several possible strategies to eliminating the inequity caused
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by the corporate tax. These include actions as simple as raising the tax rates
on those who qualify as accredited investors beyond the tax rates applicable
to ordinary investors. An alternative way of addressing the issue, and the
focus of this article, is to integrate the corporate and individual income
taxes to achieve vertical equity. This article argues that corporate
integration is necessary to maintain and promote a progressive income tax.
The theory of vertical equity depends upon progressive tax rates and
burdens; the only way to achieve a truly progressive tax structure is to
integrate corporate taxes so that those with more income carry the higher
burden. To achieve vertical equity among taxpayers, all income profits and
gains on equity investments, regardless of the entity invested in, should be
taxed at progressive tax rates.
Correcting the lack of vertical equity on the taxation of corporate
investments can also address the revenue losses that can occur as a result of
corporate integration. This would not only promote vertical equity, but also
would minimize revenue loss by integrating the corporate and personal
income taxes. It would eliminate the double tax and reduce the tax burden
for some taxpayers while increasing the tax burden for higher income
taxpayers, regardless of their classification as accredited investors or the
type of entity they invest in. Instead, their income tax would be based only
on the amount of their income. There would no longer be a lower tax rate
available to those who have accumulated wealth in the past. Under the
improved regime, if a taxpayer receives income from an equity investment,
the logic behind its taxation would be the greater the income, the greater
the ability to pay.
In addition, if the real goal of tax policy is to tax wealth, then the
partnership and hedge fund tax structures also should be overhauled to
promote vertical equity.86 It is estimated that hedge fund assets will grow to
over $ 1 trillion over the next five to ten years.87 The amount invested in
partnerships and limited liability companies rather than corporations has
also increased over the last 30 years,88 with business income generated by
unincorporated forms growing from twenty-one percent in 1980 to fifty
percent in 2008.89 Even if it is presumed that more high-income taxpayers
hold stock, that does not change the lack of progressivity and as a result the
lack of vertical equity faced by lower income taxpayers who make the
86. The number of hedge funds has increased tremendously over the last 20 years and
it has been projected that the assets held in hedge funds will exceed $1 trillion in the next
five to ten years. Wallis K. Finger, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s
“Accredited Investor” Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH U. L. REV. 733, 736 (200809).
87. Id.
88. Bank, supra note 51, at 258.
89. Id.
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same investment.
A.

Taking a Look at Integration

Corporate integration seeks to eliminate the corporate income tax and
tax earnings at the shareholder level.90 A number of experts and analysts
believe the solution to corporate tax policy issues is to integrate the
corporate and individual income rates so that a single rate applies to
income generated by corporations. As argued by Michael Doran in
Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate Double Tax, “[b]oth
policymakers and academics generally agree that the double tax results in
significant distortions of economic and business decisions and argue for its
repeal.”91 Many economists have proposed integration as a solution to the
corporate tax’s inefficiencies, the competitive disadvantages produced by
the double layer of tax and the high expenses incurred by corporations
avoiding, complying or navigating the tax.92
Many critics of corporate integration assume that integration “would
be accomplished at a substantial cost in revenue and progressivity, since a
high proportion of dividends flows to high-income, wealthy individuals.”93
However, as this article’s analysis has already shown, the current corporate
tax policy is regressive and contravenes vertical equity. The solution to this
is corporate integration.
How integration should be implemented varies across proposals. Some
proposals suggest a direct tax on shareholders on the corporation’s earnings
while exempting corporate income from tax. Other proposals advocate
taxing the corporation on the income it generates and excluding or
exempting profits distributed or recognized by the shareholders.
Full integration proposals suggest taxing corporate income at the tax
rate of the corporation’s shareholders and completely eliminating the two
layers of tax.94 Partnership taxation is a prevalent illustration of full
integration and has been offered as a model for corporate integration.

90. Sunley, supra note 74, at 626. 
91. Doran, supra note 32, at 528; see also American Law Institute, FEDERAL INCOME
TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS AND REPORTER’S STUDY ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS
337 (1982) (highlighting “widespread discussion” on integrating corporate and shareholder
taxes).
92. See, e.g., Ballentine, supra note 51, at 7 (proposing integration as a solution to the
double-level corporate income tax); Cunningham, supra note 33, at 445-448 (noting the
context of worldwide policy, the competitive disadvantage created by the double tax rate on
corporations in the United States).
93. American Law Institute, supra note 91, at 328-29.
94. Id.; Ballentine, supra note 51, at 7.
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However, this mode of integration is routinely dismissed as highly complex
and infeasible to administrate.95
Partial integration proposals are usually adaptations of two
fundamental integration structures. These proposals reduce the burden
imposed by the double tax, but generally retain both taxes in some form.
One approach to partial integration suggests retaining the corporate income
tax while allowing the corporation to take a deduction for any dividends it
pays to its shareholders.96 The second approach promotes retaining the
corporate income tax, but providing a tax credit to shareholders for their
share of corporate income taxes paid on dividends distributed to the
shareholder.97 Integration proposals rarely advance beyond discussion and
analysis because the transition to an integrated corporate tax structure could
involve significant administrative upheaval and uncertainty.98
1.

Integration Issues with Tax-Exempt and International Investors

A significant challenge that integration proposals face is how to treat
shareholders who avoid the shareholder tax under the current tax system,
but are subject to the corporate income tax, in particular tax-exempt and
foreign shareholders. Because of this challenge, many integration proposals
focus on ways to achieve an integrated corporate tax while ensuring these
unique shareholders are taxed on their share of corporate earnings.99 Some
of the proposals resulting from this type of focus are not ideal and fail to
advance vertical equity or resolve the repressiveness of corporate tax
policy. Instead, such proposals either maintain or exacerbate the
repressiveness of the tax.
The complications involved in tailoring an integration proposal that
captures these unique shareholders is especially problematic in the context
of debt investments. Debt investments in a corporation are already a taxfree investment as a result of the corporate income tax deduction for
interest.100 The tax-exempt or foreign shareholder is not subject to tax on

95. Id. (“Many early proponents of integration have recognized a number of practical
administrative problems that might be involved in shifting to a fully integrated—or even a
partially integrated system.”); Sunley, supra note 74, at 625.
96. American Law Institute, supra note 91, at 328.
97. Id.
98. See Ballentine, supra note 51, at 9 (providing that because of the difficulties of
administering an integrated system, “there appears to be a temporary impasse with respect to
any broadly based support for tax reform by way of integration”).
99. See, e.g., Gravelle, supra note 46 at 14 (explaining his plan for integration).
100. See Dept. of the Treasury, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX
SYSTEMS:
TAXING
BUSINESS
INCOME
ONCE
1
(1992)
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/integration.pdf (explaining
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their receipt of interest income (by the United States) and the amount of
interest distributed to these holders is not subject to corporate income tax
because of the deduction corporations are permitted for interest paid. Taxexempt shareholders currently do not pay any tax on income they earn that
is generated in partnerships and other pass though entities. Therefore, that
income escapes taxation.
Over sixty percent of shareholders in publicly held corporations are
tax “insensitive” investors including foreign shareholders and tax-exempt
entities such as 501(c)(3) entities, tax-deferred accounts, pension plans,
retirement funds, and state and local governments.101 Hence, integration
could lead to a significant revenue loss.102
There is, however, a point that is often overlooked when considering
the tax consequences to tax-exempt entities in an integration proposal. That
is that although the tax-exempt entity itself is exempt from taxation on its
investments, in the case of deferred tax plans, 401(k) plans, pension plans
and similar tax-exempt entities, when its corporate investments are
distributed to the individual taxpayers, those taxpayers will pay tax on the
amounts they receive at ordinary income rates.103 Therefore, the earnings
generated by the corporation and the appreciation in the value of its stock
does not entirely escape taxation, but is merely deferred and then taxed at
ordinary income rates.104 Currently, tax-exempt entities bear their share of
the corporate tax burden through the 34% corporate income tax and its
investments being taxed a second time at ordinary income tax rates when
distributions are made to their participants.105
By maintaining the corporate income tax to ensure tax-exempt entities
bear a portion of the corporate income tax burden, integration proposals
actually increase the tax burdens borne by individual taxpayers who hold
indirect ownership in the entities’ corporate investments. This again raises
the specter of the regressive nature of the corporate tax as well as the
limited choices of investment available to taxpayers. If the goal of these

that corporate earnings distributed as interest to debt suppliers are only taxed once since the
interest is deductible and taxed to lenders as ordinary income; see also Gravelle, supra note
46 at 14 (noting the preferential tax treatment and admitting that there is no ideal solution.)
101. Rydqvist, supra note 23, at 2-3; see Doran, supra note 32, at 542-43 (analyzing the
twenty-five percent of corporate equity held by shareholders that are exempt from income
tax); Gergen, supra note 64, at 156 (noting that sixty percent of tax equity is held by taxinsensitive investors).
102. See Doran, supra note 32, at 542-43 (analyzing the ramifications of the percentage
of corporate equity held by income tax-exempt shareholders); Gergen, supra note 63, at 156
(examining the makeup of investors that are not subject to income tax).
103. I.R.C.§61(a); I.R.C §401(a); I.R.C. §401(k)(1); Treas. Reg. §1.401-1(a).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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proposals is to avoid lost revenue as a result of shares owned by tax-exempt
entities, then other revenue sources such as the income from partnership
and LLC investments should be considered to mitigate the regressive
nature of taxes on corporate investment.
For similar reasons, integration proposals that support maintaining the
corporate income tax and allowing dividends to be tax-exempt may
actually undercut the benefits received by tax deferred and other retirement
plans. If the corporate income tax is maintained and dividends are excluded
from shareholder income, then the incentive to invest in tax-deferred plans
is eliminated because it is just as profitable to hold stock directly rather
than through a retirement plan.106
Although foreign taxpayers are often subject to withholding structures,
many treaties deliberately exempt certain types of income, including
dividend income from taxation. Therefore, integration proposals that seek
to continue the corporate income tax as a means of circumventing true tax
exemption for foreign shareholders do so at the expense of vertical equity
and ordinary taxpayers.107 Alternatives include modifying treaties to ensure
these shareholders are subject to taxation, engaging the withholding
systems that currently exist or allowing the income generated by
corporations and distributed to foreign shareholders to escape taxation.
Directly taxing foreign shareholders would also create more transparency
in the corporate tax rules and simplify the current tax structure.
2.

Integration Issues – Corporate Managers and Retained Earnings

Some experts have asserted that corporate integration has not
successfully advanced into practice because corporate managers do not
support integration.108 Corporate managers prefer the two layers of tax on
corporate income because it allows them to exert greater control over
retained earnings. The argument is that even if shareholders prefer
integration, corporate managers will continue to oppose and lobby against
pro-integration policies.109 Furthermore, many of the managers that do not
openly oppose integration will at the very least demonstrate “managerial
106. See Doran, supra note 32, at 547 (acknowledging that if there were not
shareholder-level taxes imposed on dividends paid by stock held outside a plan, there would
be no incentive for holding it inside the plan).
107. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1205 (2004) (comparing maintaining the corporate tax
to tax foreign shareholders in the United States to “letting the tail wag the dog”).
108. See Jennifer Arlen & Debra Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105
YALE L. J. 325, 327 (1996) (attributing the otherwise “puzzling” persistence of the doublelevel tax to the lobbying of corporate managers).
109. Id.
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diffidence” to its proposals.110 Some have argued that the corporate tax may
be justified because a unique attribute of corporations is their managers
have the ability to retain earnings and use them as necessary for corporate
affairs.111
Economic scholars used to assume that if the way dividends were
taxed changed, then the dividend distribution policies of corporate
managers would also change.112 The basic assumption was that if the tax
cost imposed on dividends decreased, then more dividends would be
distributed.113 Instead, more recently, scholars have opined that a change in
the tax costs affecting dividends does not affect the dividend distribution
policies in the long term.114 Rather, the decisions by corporate managers
regarding distributions of dividends are driven by other factors. As a result,
the pressure on managers to distribute dividends from corporate income tax
integration proposals should be irrelevant. Despite the reality that corporate
tax policy is unlikely to affect the dividend distribution practices of
corporate managers, these corporate managers continue to keep the issue at
the forefront to discourage attempts at integration. The corporate managers
suggest that integration proposals that provide for a deduction on dividends
will be to the detriment of the corporation, as corporate managers are
forced to distribute dividends because of the changes — a suggestion not
supported at all by the facts. Over 70% of chief financial officers (CFOs) of
dividend paying corporations asserted that dividend taxation did not, or

110. Id. at 327.
111. See Steve Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO.
L. J. 889, 893 (2006) (highlighting that managers in the corporate context may use corporate
resources for “empire-building at the expense of shareholder interest”); Sunley, supra note
74, at 622-623 (attributing business opposite to integration to concerns regarding unfairly
dispersing its benefits across and within industries).
112. See James M. Poterba & Lawrence H. Summers, The Economic Effects of Dividend
Taxation, in RECENT ADVANCES IN CORPORATE FINANCE 267–69, 277 (1985)(discussing
several competing hypotheses, based off of British data on security returns, dividend payout
rates, and corporate investment, about the economic effects of dividend taxation); see also
George R. Zodrow, On the “Traditional” and “New” Views of Dividend Taxation, 44
NAT’L TAX J. 497, 504-07 (1991)(providing six studies of direct empirical evidence
regarding the effects of dividend taxation).
113. See Katherine Pratt, Deficits and the Dividend Tax Cut: Tax Policy as the
Handmaiden of Budget Policy, 41 GA. L. REV. 503, 533 (2007)(explaining that the effects of
a dividend tax cut would vary depending on the correct view of dividends—either traditional
or new. For example, under the new view, a permanent dividend tax cut would result in
elimination of the tax incentive to pay dividends).
114. See Bank, supra note 1, at 518-520 (demonstrating through historical analysis that
previous enactments of undistributed profits tax, irrespective of their severity, generally
failed to affect dividend tax policy); see also Poterba & Summers, supra note 112
(discussing the recent British tax policy changes and their applicability to the United States);
Zodrow, supra note 112 (noting the lack of change in long term policies).
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probably did not, affect dividend distributions, and 87% of CFOs at nondividend distributing corporations stated that eliminating taxation of
dividends would not, or probably would not, lead to an increase in the
payment of dividends.115 “Integration of the corporate and shareholder
income taxes might not affect corporate dividend policy as significantly as
its proponents predict.”116
Recently, the amount of dividends distributed did increase after the
reduction in dividend tax rates in 2003; however, many postulated that this
increase was temporary.117 Two explanations for the increase in dividend
distributions include that managers were pressured to distribute more
dividends at reduced rates, or alternatively, corporate managers were
concerned that the reduction in dividend tax rates was temporary and
therefore made distributions to take advantage of the change while they had
a chance.118 As a result, once the reduced tax rate became permanent, the
pressure on managers was eliminated.119 Second, reflecting the more recent
proposition that tax policies do not affect dividend distribution rates,
corporate managers pay dividends for other reasons, such as dividend
payments sending a message about the health of the corporation.120
Corporate managers prefer to retain earnings, which gives them the
discretion to spend or save these funds.121 Therefore, corporate managers
will evaluate integration proposals based on how they affect distribution,
retention policies, and strategies.122 Corporate managers argue that by
incentivizing distribution of retained earnings, Congress would be
substituting its own business judgment for the judgment of corporate
officers regarding the best time to distribute earnings.123 The double tax on
corporate income creates an incentive to retain earnings because leaving
115. Bank, supra note 1, at 517.
116. Id. at 466.
117. See Pratt, supra note 113, at 517 (discussing the 2003 dividend tax cut, where Bush
proposed a dividend exclusion that “would have permitted shareholders to exclude from
income 100% of dividends on corporate earnings that had already been fully taxed on the
entity level”).
118. Id. at 533–34.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 535 (citing Alon Brav, et. al., Payout Policy in the 21st Century, 77 J. FIN.
ECON. 483 (2005).
121. See Bank, supra note 112, at 933-34 (positing that managers would rather that
corporations rely on outside financing resources than take from their retained earnings by
changing their dividend policy).
122. See also Gergen, supra note 64, at 156 (stating that in evaluating proposals,
managers aim to maximize shareholder value).
123. See Bank, supra note 112, at 933-34 (“A forced change in dividend policy would
effectively substitute ‘the blanket judgment of Congress and the Treasury department, based
on a general theory,’ for the individual judgment of business managers, based on their direct
knowledge of the needs of their particular company’”).

ARTICLE 3 (CONWAY).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1210

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

9/29/15 2:24 PM

[Vol. 17:4

the earnings in the corporation allows them to grow subject to only one
level of taxation, avoiding the second dividend level tax.124 Some analysts
have suggested that corporate managers are willing to subject corporate
earnings to a second layer of tax if it preserves their ability to control the
distribution of earnings.125 Consequently, rather than seeking the repeal of
the double tax on corporate earnings, corporate managers express support
for reduced tax rates or other tax preferences.126 Individual taxpayers also
have an incentive for the corporation to retain the corporate earnings. When
the tax rate for individuals is higher than the tax rate for corporations,
higher income taxpayers may prefer leaving the earnings in the corporation,
which permits those earnings to grow subject to the lower corporate tax
rate.127 In this manner, the corporate form can serve as a tax shelter for
high-income taxpayers.128 Larger distributions could help vertical equity in
the sense that more distributions allow for a greater ability to pay taxes.
Although corporate managers are protective of their control of
retained earnings, the practice is subject to criticism. High amounts of
retained earnings were cited as one of the causes of the Great Depression.129
Critics argued that the practice of retaining high amounts of earnings gave
business managers too much confidence, causing them to act outside the
best interests of the corporation.130 Recent corporate scandals raised similar
criticisms, as some observers attributed the misuse of funds to the practice
of corporate managers’ accumulation and hoarding of those corporate
funds.131

124. Id.
125. See Bank, supra note 1, at 466 (“[e]ssentially, business agreed to trade double
taxation and higher corporate income tax rates for the right to retain earnings without
government interference.”).
126. Bank, supra note 51, at 193; Sunley, supra note 74, at 622-623.
127. Id.
128. See Gergen, supra note 63, at 156 (explaining that a large portion of a company’s
income can be shielded from being reported as taxable income by maximizing shareholder
value through serving an identified tax clientele. That clientele benefits by having its tax
attributes inputted into the company’s financial test for evaluating projects.). 
129. Bank, supra note 1, at 466, 506.
130. See REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE INDUSTRIAL DISCIPLINE AND THE GOVERNMENTAL
ARTS 205 (1933)(explaining that the government has a social responsibility to regulate
economic matters including business managers’ practice of retaining high amounts of
earnings); 75 CONG. REC. 6341 (1932) (statement of Rep. McFadden) (arguing that
corporations’ profits were too large, and that after dismissing workmen and cutting
dividends sold to the public, with remaining surpluses, these corporations no longer
benefitted the public or the corporations themselves); Speech Before the Democratic
National Convention (July 2, 1932), 1 PUB. PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 651 (1938) (providing that corporations retained unnecessary surpluses and
expanded needlessly and speculatively, which led to the Great Depression).
131. See Steven A. Bank, The Dividend Divide in Anglo-American Corporate Taxation,
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Because of the issues raised by retained earnings, full integration
proposals such as the partnership model, or the total elimination of the
corporate income tax, are likely not feasible. Some form of the corporate
income tax must continue to ensure that retained earnings are subject to tax,
and are not forever exempt by being held within the corporation.132
Otherwise, the corporate form would serve as a tax shelter for high-income
taxpayers until they sold their interests in the corporation.133 It could also
permit high-income taxpayers to completely escape taxation by holding
onto the stock until death, and receiving a step-up, allowing the corporate
earnings to completely escape taxation.
3.

Integration Proposals

The Dividend Exclusion Method
The 2003 reduction in dividend tax rates was an attempt at partial
integration through dividend exclusions, which meant that the corporate
income tax stayed intact, but the shareholders reduced their tax rate on
dividends received.134 Originally the proposal had been to completely
exclude dividends, but a modified version was ultimately enacted.135
Corporate managers objected to the proposal because they were concerned
about the possible pressure from investors to distribute tax-free earnings.136
Although the 2003 dividend rate cut was a move toward corporate and
income tax integration, it did nothing to alleviate the regressive nature of
corporate tax policy. Because the progressive ordinary income rates were
30 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2004-2005) (describing the concern that Enron and associated scandals
were associated with the reported decline in dividend paying companies and President
Bush’s proposal to eliminate double taxation was partially justified to address such a
concern).
132. Ballentine, supra note 51, at 8.
133. Id. at 7 (“To omit any tax on retentions allows a large loophole for investors to
channel their savings through corporations tax-free.”).
134. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §
302, 117 Stat. 752 (2003).
135. H.R. 2, 108th Cong. § 201 (2003) (enacted); S. 2, 108th Cong. § 201 (2003)
(enacted); see DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
FISCAL
YEAR
2004
REVENUE
PROPOSALS
12
(2003),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-ExplanationsFY2004.pdf (providing an overview of the proposal for eliminating double taxation of
corporate earnings); see also Pratt, supra note 110, at 517(describing President Obama’s
2003 dividend exclusion proposal that would have allowed shareholders to exclude all
dividends on corporate earnings that were already fully taxed on the entity level).
136. Pratt, supra note 135 at 520–22,571 (stating others have argued that dividend tax
cuts were not implemented correctly and should be repealed because they are ineffective at
ensuring that corporate income is taxed once, and because of revenue loss); but see id. at
517 (pointing out that there were at least some benefits to the dividend tax cuts).
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no longer applicable to dividends, higher income taxpayers had a lower tax
rate available to them, making the corporate tax policy more regressive
and, once again, failing to meet vertical equity.
A dividend exclusion model could work to integrate personal and
corporate taxes, and contribute to greater vertical equity, if the individual
income tax rates for high-income investors were greater than the corporate
income tax rates; this would ensure that income generated from nonaccredited investors would face a higher tax burden. Many countries in the
European Union moved to a dividend exclusion model after the shareholder
credit method was successfully attacked in the European Court of Justice.137
The dividend exclusion method of integration also ensures that tax-exempt
entities and foreign persons are subject to at least one level of tax on their
corporate equity investments.138
The Shareholder Credit Method
Another integration model that could be modified to promote the
principles of vertical equity is the shareholder credit method. Many foreign
countries have also enacted this form of integration.139 In the shareholder
credit model of integration, the corporate income tax remains intact; the
corporation pays the tax, and when dividends are distributed to
shareholders, they also receive a tax credit equal to the relative portion of
the corporate income taxes paid on those distributions. Therefore, while the
corporation pays the tax, the corporation’s income is ultimately imputed to
the shareholder. This method could serve vertical equity and eliminate the
current regressive quality of the corporate tax. If the tax rates on dividends
were progressive, and, as a result, high-income taxpayers had a tax rate
higher than the corporate income tax rate, then the credit would alleviate
some of the tax burden but provide for an additional tax on the proceeds.
On the other hand, low-income taxpayers’ tax burden would be met by the
credit. Certain shareholder credit models go further to improve vertical
equity by allowing shareholders a refundable credit, so if the taxpayer’s
personal tax rate is lower than the corporate tax rate, he or she actually gets
a refund.140 This would make the corporate tax more progressive.
Moreover, some shareholder credit proposals suggest that the corporate
income tax rate should match the highest personal income tax rate to

137. See Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the
Political and Economic Integration of Europe, 115 YALE L. J. 1186, 1212 (2006) (detailing
countries in the European Union’s tax policies).
138. Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S.
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L. J. 1021, 1025, 1033 (1996-97).
139. See Gravelle, supra note 46, at 14.
140. Bank, supra note 51, at 225.
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prevent the corporation from serving as a tax shelter for high rate
individuals.141 A downside to this approach, however, is that it raises
corporate tax rates even higher, which may further damage the
competitiveness of the United States.142
The CBIT
The Treasury Department designed an integration model in 1992
called the Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT). The goal of the
CBIT was to integrate personal and corporate income taxes, and at the
same time, come up with equivalent tax rules for partnerships and other
types of business.143 This type of proposal could have achieved vertical
equity among investment types by establishing the same tax models for
equity investments by both accredited and non-accredited investors,
provided the tax rates are progressive. The CBIT taxes almost all
businesses alike, regardless of form.144 In the original CBIT proposal, most
distributions received would be excluded from tax.145 Because the CBIT
would serve a flat tax on investment income, it would not create a more
progressive tax burden, although it would alleviate the regressivity in
current corporate tax policy.146 Moreover, the CBIT could create an even
more regressive system because of ability-to-pay concerns.
Accordingly, to achieve vertical equity within the CBIT system, the
corporate tax rate would have to be lower than the tax rate available to
other types of entities that non-accredited investors are precluded from
investing in, or there would have to be an additional tax to high-income
taxpayers on their investment to create the necessary progressivity. The
CBIT did safeguard the revenue from tax-exempt and foreign investors
who would not escape taxation under the CBIT.
Similar to the shareholder credit method, because it may require a
higher tax rate to maintain progressivity, it might not enhance the
competitiveness of the United States internationally.
The BEIT
The Business Enterprise Income Tax (BEIT) is an integration proposal
designed by the former Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation,
Edward Kleinbard. The BEIT taxes all income from equity interests in
141. Gergen, supra note 63, at 146.
142. American Law Institute, supra note 91, at 393; GRAVELLE, supra note 46, at 14.
143. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX
SYSTEMS:
TAXING
BUSINESS
INCOME
ONCE
39
(1992),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/integration.pdf.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Sunley, supra note 74, at 632 (discussing the affect the CBIT would have).
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partnerships and corporations at an identical rate.147 The corporation
receives a deduction for a fixed percentage of its capital, and the investors
receive a tax bill for a corresponding fixed percentage on their investment
(debt or equity). The individual taxpayers pay the tax.148 The BEIT removes
the regressivity of the corporate tax because investors are assessed a tax
under the BEIT, and then also pay tax on the income they receive at their
personal income tax rates. An investor in a corporation is taxed on his
investment based upon an imputed rate of return, regardless of the amount
distributed.149 The BEIT imposes an entity tax rate between twenty-five to
twenty-eight percent.150 The investor tax rates would be graduated and
progressive.151 If investors receive distributions exceeding the imputed
percentage, there is an additional tax.152
The BEIT reverses the
regressivity of current corporate tax policy because the personal tax rates
on the investment income are progressive, and equity investments in
partnerships no longer have a lower tax burden than equity investments in
corporations, putting accredited and non-accredited investors on equal
footing.
Nonetheless, the BEIT does not completely resolve lack of vertical
equity. The BEIT creates an ability to pay issue and an affordability issue.
The BEIT requires investors to pay tax on these percentages even if the
investment loses value.153 The BEIT imposes the tax even on investments
that lose value, under the assumption that the decrease in value must be
illusory otherwise investors would dispose of the investment.154 As a result,

147. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Rehabilitating the Business Income Tax, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION THE HAMILTON PROJECT (2007) [hereinafter Rehabilitating the Business
Income Tax](presenting Kleinbard’s BEIT proposal for parallel taxation of capital income,
including integrating taxes at the corporate and individual levels); see also Edward D.
Kleinbard, The Business Enterprise Income Tax: A Prospectus,106 TAX NOTES 97, 98
(2005)[hereinafter The Business Enterprise Income Tax](describing the BEIT as a means of
minimizing the role of tax considerations in business thinking, by implementing, among
others, a single tax system); but see Alvin Warren, The Business Enterprise Income Tax: A
First Appraisal, 118 TAX NOTES 921, 926 (2008) (…).
148. Warren, supra note 147, at 98.
149. Id.; Warren, supra note 147, at 97-98; Kleinbard, Rehabilitating the Business
Income Tax, supra note 147 at 36.
150. Kleinbard, Rehabilitating the Business Income Tax, supra note 147 at 36
151. Id.
152. Id.; Warren, supra note 147, at 921, 925.
153. See Rehabilitating the Business Income Tax, supra note 147 (discussing the fact
that the BEIT is able to achieve a comprehensive and consistent taxation of capital income
and reduce tax-planning incentives, by integrating taxes at the corporate and individual
levels, ensuring that all income is taxed once); but see Warren, supra note 147, at 921, 928
(2008) (arguing that the BEIT perhaps does not achieve all of its goals and purposes).
154. See Rehabilitating the Business Income Tax, supra note 147 (discussing the
logistics and implementation of the BEIT); Kleinbard, The Business Enterprise Income Tax:
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the BEIT creates an ability to pay issue, forcing taxpayers who lack
sufficient liquidity to sell their investment to pay the tax bill.155 If the
investment has lost value, ultimately the taxpayers recognize that loss when
the investment is sold because of basis adjustments, but the taxpayers with
a lower ability to pay would still be forced to sell their investment because
of this nuance in the proposal.156 Further, not all of the tax rates in the BEIT
are progressive; if excess distributions are made, those distributions are
taxed at a flat rate.157 To promote vertical equity, the proposal would have
to be amended, however, to provide for progressive rates on excess
distributions.
The BEIT also does not resolve how to address tax-exempt
investors.158 The BEIT makes suggestions for numerous options regarding
tax-exempt shareholders, including taxing them or excluding them
altogether, but does not advocate a particular position.159 Moreover, the
BEIT simply exempts foreign investors from taxation.160 It is unclear how
these changes could affect revenue.
Finally, other integration proposals such as business activities tax
(BAT), the consumption tax, the value-added tax (VAT), and the flat tax
propose taxing income at flat rates. As a result, they would not serve to
promote vertical equity.161
The Deduction for Dividends
A corporate deduction for dividends distributed is another alternative
that could create vertical equity in corporate tax policy while not affecting
the accredited investor rules.162 This method of integration leaves the
A Prospectus, supra note 147, at 100 (expanding further on the BEIT); but see Warren,
supra note 147, at 921, 929 (arguing against the presumption that decreases are illusory).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Rehabilitating the Business Income Tax, supra note 147 (distinguishing
between flat and progressive taxes); but see Warren, supra note 147, at 921, 927 (providing
an alternate interpretation of the BEIT’s flat and progressive tendencies).
158. See Kleinbard, Rehabilitating the Business Income Tax, supra note 147, at 36
(explaining the fact that BEIT would not affect tax-exempt investors is not a flaw with
BEIT).
159. Id. at 36-38.
160. Id. at 36.
161. See generally Cunningham & Engler, supra note 33 (proposing an integrated
corporate and income tax as a consumption tax, as well as explaining other versions of VAT
and flat taxes as solutions to the corporate integration issue). However, because the article
does not recognize the current lack of equity in the corporate tax as a result of accredited
investor standards and the corporate tax rate, these solutions do not serve to address vertical
equity issues.
162. The dividend deduction method had been enacted earlier in the history of the
corporate income tax. However, it was short lived and was enacted during a different
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underlying corporate tax in place, allowing Congress to continue to use the
corporate tax as a tool to regulate or control corporate behavior. The
corporation calculates its corporate tax and then is permitted a deduction
for any dividend distributions it paid. Any earnings that are retained are
typically still taxed in a dividend deduction proposal, and shareholders
must pay a tax on the amounts they are distributed. If the tax on the
shareholders is progressive, this method can eliminate the regressive nature
of the corporate tax with respect to the amounts that are distributed,
because just like equity in other types of investments, corporate equity
would only be subject to a single layer of tax. Another benefit of choosing
an integration method that leaves the corporate tax in place is that corporate
earnings are not able to escape taxation entirely by using the estate tax.
Without a corporate income tax, a shareholder could hold onto stock as it
appreciated in value and receive a step-up in basis to the fair market value
at death, allowing the corporate income to escape taxation.163 If a
shareholder seeks to use the estate tax to circumvent the corporate tax, the
earnings left in the corporation will be taxed because they are not
distributed.
Despite those benefits of a dividend deduction, it is possible that taxexempt and foreign shareholders could escape all taxation on their share of
corporate earnings because the tax at the corporate level is eliminated for
distributions. This method is often criticized because of the difficulty in
taxing foreign investors.164 If the dividend deduction were chosen as the
integration method, this special class of taxpayers could be subject to a
direct tax and subject to withholding or completely excluded from tax.
Another critique of the dividend deduction integration method is that it
could put pressure on corporate managers to make distributions of earnings
to shareholders, because the corporate tax only applies if earnings are
retained; if they are distributed, there is a deduction.165 A possible solution
is to provide an allowance for capital investments, such as deductions for
depreciation and research and development credits.
The American Law Institute (ALI) has lent its support in the past to a
economic time. See e.g. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND
MATERIALS ON BUSINESS TAX ISSUES PREPARED FOR THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND
MEANS TAX POLICY DISCUSSION SERIES (Doc JCX023-02) (2002), available at
http://www.jct.gov/x-23-02.pdf (discussing foreign and domestic taxation).
163. 26 U.S.C. § 1014 (2014).
164. See U.S. DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 48, at 107 (explaining why a
dividend deduction is against US policy).
165. See Bank, supra note 1, at 535 (explaining why it is beneficial for shareholders to
allow managers to retain earnings); see also Mark P. Gergen, supra note 63, at 156
(explaining that where shareholders pay the initial tax, managers are indifferent to reported
income).
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dividend deduction method of integration, suggesting that dividends on
newly issued shares receive some degree of tax relief.166 The ALI’s
proposal was restricted to newly issued equity because a deduction on
previously issued equity could create a windfall for earnings already built
into stock existing at the time of enactment.167 Moreover, the ALI did not
suggest a complete dividend deduction, which might create pressure on
corporations to distribute excess or extraordinary dividends to take
advantage of the deduction.168 The Treasury Department has also raised the
possibility of integration through partial dividend deduction. In 1984, it
recommended 50% corporate deduction for dividends paid.169 The
subsequent Presidential tax proposal the following year included a 10%
corporate dividend deduction.170 Neither proposal received the support of
Congress or businesses.
The partial deduction for dividends would serve to lower the tax
burden on corporate equity investments, but it would not completely
alleviate the lack of vertical equity because the accredited investor
standards would still permit high-income taxpayers to invest in equity that
non-accredited investors could not at a lower tax burden. In addition, while
the partial deductions would lower the rate, it would not lower them
enough to create a progressive tax system when compared with the
effective rates on other business entities.
A full dividend deduction would meet the goals of vertical equity.
The income generated by the corporate investments would be taxed at
individual taxpayer’s personal income tax rates, which would be
progressive. This single layer of tax, mirroring how the income generated
from pass though entitlements is taxed at the personal income rates, would
mean that the distortion created by the accredited investor standard would
no longer prevent vertical equity. Because the tax burden on these
investments would now be progressive, the regressive nature to the
corporate tax policy would be eliminated. The difficulty to enacting a
dividend deduction is, similar to the BEIT, how to treat tax-exempt and
foreign shareholders. The dividend deduction method of integration would
result in an increase in the competitiveness of the United States.
In addition, this integration method is likely to garner opposition from
166. American Law Institute, supra note 91, at 328; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., AM. LAW
INST., Integration of the Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, Reporter’s Study of
Corporate Tax Integration (1993).
167. Id. at 330; see also Thomas D. Griffity, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 715, 739 (1983)
(explaining the problematic windfall).
168. American Law Institute, supra note 91, at 330.
169. U.S. DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 82, at 124.
170. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 162, at 47 (explaining the
history of dividend tax deduction proposals)
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corporate managers because of the tax that would remain on retained
earnings. If a corporate income tax deduction for dividends were enacted,
corporate managers might spend as much money as possible to avoid being
forced to make distributions and retain control over corporate earnings,
even to the detriment of the corporation. For example, corporate managers
might seek out expenses that are deductible immediately, rather than capital
expenditures, which might be a wiser investment in the long run, to avoid
paying taxes on retained earnings. A solution could be to create a capital
investment and cash reserve fund that is exempt from the corporate income
tax until the capital project is sold, or as long as the cash is reserved for
certain types of expenses such as employment contracts, research and
development, or other preferred expenses.
4.

Issues with Integration

Rationales made by observers for why corporate integration proposals
fail include speculating that resistance to corporate tax integration
proposals emanates not only from corporate managers, but also from
industries that benefit from two layers of tax (i.e. investment banks,
accounting firms and others that profit from creating corporate income tax
shelters), and tax-exempt shareholders.171 Another possible reason why the
two layers of tax on corporate income continue is a fear of the unknown.
While inefficient and cumbersome, it is familiar and has withstood
economic upheaval, and there is risk involved in changing the corporate
income tax structure. Although the ideal time for a significant change in
corporate tax policy is during an economic recovery, such as the dramatic
policy changes made following the Great Depression,172 it can be an
intimidating proposition because of this aversion to risk.
Hesitancy to adopt an integration tax policy also results from the
perception that the general public disapproves of corporate integration.173 It
is conceivable that the public perceives the integration of corporate and
shareholder taxes as a “corporate tax break” and overlooks the reality that
individual taxpayers ultimately bear the burden of the corporate income tax
while corporations are simply a conduit to collect it.174 “The public is
171. See Doran, supra note 32, at 521 (explaining opposition to changing double
taxation).
172. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, Pub. L. No. 74-740, 49 Stat. 1648
(establishing a major tax overhaul on corporations); Hearings on H.R. 12395 Before the S.
Comm. on Fin., 74th Cong. 93 (1936) (statement of M.L. Seidman, chairman, Tax
Committee, New York Board of Trade).
173. See Brauner, supra note 7, at 593 (arguing that it is hard to change taxing policy
because of popular sentiment).
174. The number of accredited individual investors was estimated to be between 5 and
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typically in favor of taxing corporations, yet they are frequently confused
about who bears the burden of the tax.”175 The public tends to prefer the
corporate tax to other alternative ways to raise revenue, viewing the
corporate tax as a way to address cynicism about corporate tax behavior.176
Furthermore, the lack of vertical equity has been absent from the
integration debate. As a result, the general public is ignorant to the high
tax burdens applicable to corporate investments, in contrary to the low tax
burdens faced by higher income taxpayers, who are accredited investors
with the choice of other investments options unavailable to most of the
general public.177
Another reason there has been little momentum to actualize and
integrate corporate income tax is that, in addition to generating revenue, the
corporate income tax is also a valuable tool for Congress to control
corporations. Congress can influence the governance of corporations and
maintain oversight of corporate management by providing tax incentives
and disincentives to corporate managers.178 Nevertheless, whether these
attempts at regulating corporate behavior have been successful and merit
the additional complexity and tax burdens the corporate income tax carries
is questionable. Consider, for example, the regulation of executive
compensation, which has been ineffective.179 The tax rules are generally
ineffective at influencing the compensation practices in corporations, which
makes the government relatively powerless unless the compensation
package somehow violates securities laws.180 Congress can use the
corporate tax to encourage investments in retirement accounts by
establishing many types of retirement accounts as tax-exempt entities.
Ultimately, the corporate income tax may exist today not because it
represents the best corporate tax policy, but because abolishing the

7.2 million people prior to enactment of Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, supra note 13, at 413, which decreased the number of accredited investors
by excluding the primary residence from the calculation of net worth; see Shane, supra note
84 (discussing number of accredited informal investors).
175. Clausing, supra note 4, at 419.
176. Cf. Thorndike, supra note 85, at 360 (discussing the public’s support of the
corporate tax).
177. See JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 35, at 2 (explaining that the public does not
realize who bears the burden of taxes); see also David Weisbach, supra note 54, at 218
(explaining it is individuals, not firms, who bear the burden of taxes).
178. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 62, at 1245-49 (explaining the regulatory role of
corporate tax).
179. See generally Meredith R. Conway, Money for Nothing and the Stocks for Free:
Taxing Executive Compensation, 17 CORNELL J. L. PUB. POL’Y 383 (2008) (discussing
Congress’ attempts to tax executive compensation).
180. Cf. id. (discussing the ineffectiveness of Congress’ attempts to rein in executive
compensation).
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corporate income tax would be controversial and, therefore, a politically
unpopular position to take.181 Although such a change would create
vertical equity and remove the regressive nature of corporate tax policy, the
general public does not recognize that the corporate income tax is primarily
borne by the shareholders or individuals and not by the corporate entity.182
Additionally, corporate managers are likely to oppose any such proposals
because they risk losing the benefits of the corporate income tax, including
control over retained earnings as well as industry specific tax breaks that
many corporations seek from Congress.183
CONCLUSION
Corporate tax policy is outdated and no longer accurately affects the
wealth it was enacted to tax. Instead of taxing the intended wealthy, the
corporate tax burdens lower income taxpayers with an unfairly high tax
burden, while those with higher incomes are able to avail themselves of
lower tax burden investment choices. This is a violation of the
fundamental tax principle of vertical equity. Because non-accredited
investors are limited to investments in corporate entities, by the accredited
investor standards, the higher tax burdens imposed under the tax code
violates principles of fairness. Meanwhile wealthy and high-income
taxpayers can choose between investing in corporations or investments
with lower effective tax rates.
Corporate tax policy combined with the accredited investor standards
cause distortions in individual and business’ behavior and investment
choices and penalize ordinary taxpayers. Furthermore, corporate tax policy
has become complicated and difficult to navigate and administer. The tax
rates are prohibitive, causing the United States to lose competitiveness.
Integration of the corporate and income taxes can resolve these issues,
creating vertical equity and reducing regressivity while increasing the
competitiveness of the corporate tax policy of the United States. Many of
the integration proposals made to date focus on the taxation of tax-exempt
entities and foreign persons, as well as the interests of corporate managers
to the detriment of the fairness to non-accredited investors. Many of the
models of integration ignore the lack of fairness and vertical equity in

181. See generally Avi-Yonah, supra note 62, at 1211 (explaining the general public’s
reticence to changing the corporate tax); but see Brauner, supra note 7, at 629 (arguing that
the assumption that the assumptions regarding the purpose of corporate taxes are incorrect).
182. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 62, at 1211 (explaining the generally held view that the
public views corporations as bearing the burden of corporate tax).
183. See Sunley, supra note 74, at 622 (explaining the business communities’ opposition
to changing the tax laws).
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current corporate tax policy, while others are under the perception that
integration many actually reduce vertical equity.
Despite these
misconceptions, most integration policies, with some slight modifications,
can achieve these goals and serve to increase vertical equity.
Corporate investment is subject to two layers of tax. At current rates,
this is a flat tax. In addition, because the burden of the corporate tax
typically falls on labor, it is a regressive tax that violates vertical equity.184
Moreover, the corporate rate itself is so high that the tax has a tendency to
be regressive because it is the only tax rate available to non-accredited
investors, while high-income accredited investors have other investment
choices that include investments subject to a single tax rate.185 Even if that
single rate is at ordinary income levels, the accredited investor bears a 35
percent burden while the non-accredited investor bears a 44.75 percent tax
burden on an investment in an otherwise identical business. This imposes
an additional 9.75 percent tax on the non-accredited investor merely
because he does not have a high enough income level to select the more
tax-efficient investment. The inequity is magnified if the companies earn
capital gain income, giving the accredited investor a fifteen percent tax
rate, which is 29.75 percent lower than the tax rate of the non-accredited
investor. Hedge funds, partnerships, limited liability companies, and a
variety of other business choices are only available to accredited investors
who earn high incomes or have a certain amount of wealth. This makes the
double tax on corporations unfair from both a vertical and a horizontal
equity standpoint.
Finally, to address the vertical inequity and the loss of revenue, this
proposal suggests that all investment income be subject to progressive,
ordinary income tax rates. With essentially a single layer of tax, the tax
burden to non-accredited investors would significantly decrease while
those with higher income levels would see their effective tax rates increase,
raising revenue and promoting vertical equity.

184. See GENTRY, supra note 56, at 32, 35 (explaining that corporate tax generally falls
on labor).
185. Id.

